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DROFESSOR  Ackerman  began by declaring the generation to be,
in his view, the "basic unit" in constitutional theory.  I agree, and
draw from  this pro-democratic  premise  a lesson with which  I expect
he in turn would agree.
Ackerman  did not expressly say in what enumeration, compiled for
purposes  of what inquiry, the generation stands  as the basic constitu-
tional-theoretic  unit.  Context, however, easily fills  that gap.  When a
principal speaker in a conference  on "Fidelity in  Constitutional The-
ory" declares  in somewhat  combative voice what he thinks the "basic
unit" is and is not, he is telling you what he thinks there  is, constitu-
tionally speaking, that might be worthy of his faith.  Not for Professor
Ackerman, then, "the clause"-for which  read:  some timelessly self-
warranting, autonomously  speaking text.  Not for him either "the the-
ory"-for which read:  some apple of the beholder's  eye.  Rather for
him the generation-for  which read:  the historically acting creator of
constitutional  law.
The creator, that is, on a full and true view of who that is.  To those
who already agree with him that proper use of the Constitution today
requires  reference  to  past historical  acts  of  constitutional  creation,
Ackerman speaks of the need to reckon with a certain true fact about
acts of creation  of our Constitution, to wit:  They were done by a suc-
cession of somewhat spiritually separated  generations.  The Constitu-
tion we have is a product of a chronologically ordered but non-linear
("discontinuous" 1)  series  of  creative  political  events,  each  one  of
which  rejected  some but not all  of its predecessors'  basic normative
premises.  As such, then, must the Constitution be  construed.
Excellent.  But when Ackerman  posits  the generation as  the basic
object of fidelity-not the clause, not the theory-he certainly intends
a message also to those who still need convincing  that proper use of
the Constitution  today requires  reference  to past historical  acts  and
events.  The message  is:  "It does."  Constitutional law  is constituted,
he declares, by a "conversation  between generations."'2  Each genera-
tion  of Americans  is  "obligated  to honor"  the  creativities  of every
predecessor generation  (barren generations  such  as  our own  to date
perforce omitted from the rolls).  Thus our task today is to say what
*  Robert Walmsley University  Professor, Harvard University.
1. Bruce Ackerman,  A  Generation  of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L  Rev. 1519,  1520
(1997).
2. I&  at 1524.
3.  I& at 1522.
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"their sound  and fury"  means.4  Thus  never for the rest  of time will
Americans-short  of  reconstituting  themselves  as  some  new  and
other  People-be  free  to  leave  off  debating  "the  meaning  of
Lochner." '
The message seemingly could not be clearer:  The most compelling
what-there-is-to-be-faithful-to,  constitutionally  speaking,  is  human
political action,  the political works  and  acts of generations.  Fidelity
does  not  run  to  an  impersonal  prescriptive  text  that just  happens,
Heaven only knows how, to be shining there before us in loco consti-
tutionis. Whatever merits our acceptance-our  "reception" 6-as  law
does so precisely by virtue of being the works and acts of the genera-
tions whose works  and acts it is.
Observe,  now,  that  the  Constitution's  meriting  our reception  for
that kifid of reason is quite different from its meriting our reception by
reason of being deemed by us, the current generation, to be probably
a right or good law for us, or at any rate to be probably pointing in the
general direction of that.  It may be that the two kinds of reasons for
constitutional reception are related.  I think they are, both because I
think that a current generation seeking a  probably good or right law
for it has reason to give heed  to certain similarly  directed  actions  of
predecessor  generations,  and because  I think that integrity  counts  in
deciding what would be a right or good law for us.7  But of course it's
not for me  alone  to decide such  matters  on my generation's  behalf.
That is why my own perception of a connection between two kinds of
reasons for constitutional  reception-that prior generations so acted,
and that my generation  so decides for itself-in no way dissolves the
radical  conceptual  difference  between the two.
One could wonder  whether some  inclination  to past-oriented  rea-
sons for constitutional reception  is already implicit in  our agreement
here,  on  this  occasion,  to probe the  matter of  "fidelity"  in  constitu-
tional theory.  Had we started  from the supposition  that what puta-
tively grounds a constitution's claim on our reception  is not that some
historical actor uttered it but rather that we as current generation find
it to  be instinct with  some  attractive  normative ideal,  then it  seems
that our focal issue  here  might have  been  not  "fidelity"  but rather
criticism in constitutional  theory.  Criticism, I mean in the discursive
and disciplinary sense:  The sense, that is, of bringing one's evaluation
of a performance into consonance with one's interpretation  of a stan-
dard for evaluation of performances  of that kind, while reciprocally
bringing  one's  interpretation  of  the  standard  into  consonance  with
one's  evaluation  of the performance.  (Compare  "reflective  equilib-
4.  ld. at 1523 (emphasis added).
5.  Id- at 1527.
6.  kla  at 1524.
7. See  Ronald Dworkin, Law's  Empire ch. VI  (1986).
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rium.") 8  We might,  I  am saying,  have  taken the  central  problem  of
constitutional  law to be not that of diachronically  tracking  between
what was written in at time one and what is read out at time two, but
rather that of a current generation's synchronically tracking between a
received  or  occurrent  practice  and  an  imperfectly  comprehended
idealization of it, between an instance  and a contestable  standard.
If there really is such a  gap  as I'm working  here to open  between
fidelity and criticism, then does  it pose some sort of practical  choice
for constitutional  interpreters?  I do have in mind  such a choice.  On
the side of fidelity, interpreters can strain within limits (that are them-
selves read out of the legal practice-in-fact  that stands  to be faithfully
rendered)  to make the Constitution's  current meaning-in-application
a true rendition of the sum of the prescriptive vectors of the works of
the generations.  On the side of criticism, interpreters can strain within
limits  (that are themselves  contained  in the idealization  of the prac-
tice-in-fact by which we criticize  and strive to correct it) to make the
Constitution's  current meaning-in-application  carry  forth or steer to-
ward some relatively more  abstract and timeless yet incomplete  and
contested ideal of what a constitution  is, what end  or ends it properly
serves in the view of us  the living.
At  stake in  this  tussle  between  faithful  and  critical  constitutional
interpretation,  I believe,  is  democratic  political  agency  or  freedom.
That is  because,  as far as  I can see,  the exercise of any  generation's
political freedom  cannot consist in  anything other than its  collective
negotiation  of the  dialectical tension-the  interpretative  space-be-
tween its actually  accepted  (criticizeable)  political practices  and pro-
fessions  and  their  corresponding  (contestable,  emergent)  political
ideals.9  Since only by and within an already constituted political  soci-
ety can that sort of negotiation  occur, some measure of constitutional
fidelity is  prerequisite  to democratic  agency.  Without an  established
set of norms to draw upon, there  is no  telling what events  ought  to
count as an expression  of "the people's"  will  or "the people's" judg-
ment in  any generation.  Yet because  the space of the negotiation  is
the  space  of  democratic  agency,  agency  stands  to be  constricted  by
whatever would  constrict  the  negotiation  space,  and  that has  to  in-
clude fidelity  to  ancestral  prescription.  This  looming  adversity  be-
tween fidelity and agency  is, I  believe,  a matter for which  Professor
Ackerman's work  has shown too little concern.
Tentatively, then:  What might be the incompletely  comprehended,
contestable  end  with  which,  in  the  "critical"  approach  to  constitu-
tional interpretation, the Constitution-as-applied  is to be brought into
a reflective equilibrium?  For Bruce Ackerman,  author of both Social
8.  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51 (1971).
9.  See Frank  I. Michelman,  Always  Under Law?, 12  Const. Commentary  227,
239-42  (1995).
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Justice in the Liberal State 10 and  We  the People,"  it would  seem that
the end ought to be liberal democracy, the project of a diverse popula-
tion's living  together as free and equal consociates, by laws that they
jointly  hammer out  for themselves.  Yet,  as  I've  already  noted, one
might  gather  from  Ackerman's  rhetoric  on  this  occasion-con-
stitutonal law is a  "conversation between generations,"  etc.-that the
end  of  democracy  calls for a  dominance  of  diachronic  fidelity  over
synchronic critical  agency in  constitutional-legal  work.
Such a teaching, if intended, would flow in the first place from insis-
tence  that democracy is, in  essence, a matter of abiding by whatever
law the People institutionally decide upon from time to time-mean-
ing, in practice, by "the People,"  a sufficient mobilized preponderance
to figure  as the whole.  Of course, such a nakedly procedural view of
what democracy is or requires is currently under siege.  Ronald Dwor-
kin, for example, argues forcefully that it's not a procedure but rather
a  state of  political  affairs  that  Americans  deeply  mean by  "democ-
racy,"  posited as an end for basic political arrangements.' 2  In the tus-
sle I have set up between the call of fidelity and the call  of criticism,
arguments  of that kind  weigh  on the  side of criticism.  I  don't pause
over them, because  my aim here is  to raise the issue between fidelity
and agency within the proceduralist  camp  of democratic theorists.
Ackerman's  pro-fidelity  argument  from  procedural  democracy
comes  down, I think, to this.  Democracy just does mean self-rule  by
the People; that is what Americans have always meant by the notion.
True, this root idea of the American People ruling themselves leaves
us with  the  problem  of telling when  the People have  spoken  law;  it
gives  us need for a  rule of recognition  of the People legislating.  But
the root idea that raises the need also  points to the form  of the  only
admissible answer to it, which  is to draw the rule of recognition from
the actual historical practice of the country.  The country came to treat
the semi-lawlessly  enacted Constitution of the 1780s  as highest law, as
it did the semi-lawlessly enacted Reconstruction amendments and as it
now  does (so Ackerman  contends  and many adamantly  deny) an un-
documented  constitutional-legal  quasi-enactment  of  the  New  Deal
era. 3  The country thus shows to itself what it counts as an apparition
of the legislating People.  On this matter as on others, our task is noth-
10.  Bruce  A. Ackerman,  Social Justice in the Liberal State  (1980).
11.  Bruce Ackerman, We the People:  Foundations (1991)  [hereinafter Ackerman,
We the  People].
12.  See  Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's  Law ch. 1 (1996).
13.  In other words, by Ackerman's account  (roughly rendered) the People served
notice  of their aroused  presence  on  the  higher-lawmaking  stage  in  the  1780s,  and
again  in the  1860s,  by approving  inventive  and formally  extra-legal  deployments by
the branches of government of conventionally recognizable  components of popularly-
based-lawmaking-and  by similar means in the  1930s  accomplished  an  amendment-
like transformation of constitutional law without anyone's professing  to Jay hands on
the documentary  text. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People:  Transformations  (forth-
coming  1997).
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ing more nor less than to listen to ourselves.  What could be more in
the spirit of democracy than popular self-rule?
The difficulty is as it has ever been (call it "counter-majoritarian,"' 4
call  it "inter-temporal" 5).  They-the  generations  of  the  Founding,
Reconstruction,  and the New Deal-are not us the living.  I would be
amazed to hear Professor Ackerman proclaiming that they were.  But
given that they are not, for us to submit in any degree to governance
by their say-so-including not least their say-so regarding rules of rec-
ognition-is for us in that same degree to be not governing ourselves.
Agreed,  wholeheartedly,  no  person  is  an  island.  Agreed,  persons
identify, in part, with political communities.  Agreed, political commu-
nities have heritages, and Lochner  is a part of ours, and it's therefore a
part of our constitutional fate  as Americans to converse forever  over
the meaning  of Lochner. Nevertheless  I  maintain  that a democratic
conversation is not inter-generational;  it is intra-generational.  What a
prior  generation  said  and  did  by the  cluster  of speech  acts  we  call
Lochner is one question.  What we might mean by Lochner is another
question.  What they said or did, as distinguished from what we might
mean, may matter for  purposes of community  on some  (not-too-lib-
eral) notion of what community is.  It may matter for purposes  of in-
tegrity,  and  integrity  may  be  an  entailment  of  democracy  on  a
substantive, Dworkinian view of what democracy is or requires.16  The
point remains  that what  some prior generation  did  as  distinguished
from what we might do is  extraneous  to democracy on an  ultimately
procedural, Ackermanian view of what democracy  is or requires,'7  as
long as  it remains  agreed that they are not us.
Professor Ackerman  has  a way of responding  to the sort of tirade
I've just launched.  It is  this:  Granted,  predecessor  generations  are
not us.  Neither, on good  authority, is Congress  us, nor any other or-
gan of representative government.'  If what we mean by democracy is
the rule of the People, we must also understand  that this People ap-
pears  in action only sporadically, in moments  of exceptional  political
mobilization which it may not be granted to every generation to know.
So  in this world  of generational  finitude  and change  (not to add,  of
14.  Alexander  M.  Bickel, The Least  Dangerous  Branch:  The Supreme Court  at
the Bar of Politics  16-23  (1962).
15.  Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering  the Constitution, 93 Yale
L.. 1013,  1045-47  (1984).
16.  See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note  12.
17.  See Ackerman, We  the People, supra note 11,  at 6-16.
18.  See Frank I. Michelman,  Foreword." Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv.  L
Rev. 4, 75  (1986).
The Air Force is not us.  Congress is not us.  The President  is not us.  "We"
are  not "in"  those  bodies.  Their determinations  are not  our self-govern-
ment.  Judges overriding those determinations do not, therefore, necessarily
subtract anything from our freedom, although the judges also, obviously, are
not us.
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variable stature among the generations), to ask for perfect democracy
is  to ask for too much.  The best that any on-coming  generation  can
do, if it means  to be ruled by the People, is to receive  as its law the
most recent  word from  an  adequately  mobilized American  citizenry,
pending that on-coming generation's own arousal  (if ever) of the Peo-
ple slumbering within it.
Ackerman's work thus regards a particular generation's  slumber as
a  given fact for theory's mill:  In fact this generation  slumbers,  so in
theory this generation takes its constitutional law from the past.  But it
seems that those committed to democracy must also regard such cases
as  deviations  from  an ideal  of active  self-government,  for theory  to
address reparatively.
Therefore, I want to say, there are two theoretical projects.  I have
already suggested  reasons for thinking that neither can  proceed very
well  or far  without  reference  to  the  other,  but  still  there  are  two
projects.  There  is the  project  of clarifying  certain  categories  of  the
concept  of  democratic  constitutional  fidelity  and  proposing  institu-
tional forms for them, and there is a parallel project for the concept of
democratic  constitutional  agency.  Regarding  fidelity, two main cate-
gories occupy the sizable literature.  The category of inter-generational
correspondence, between  what  we  the  People  willed then  and what
someone heeding  our  will from  afar rules  today in  our name, moti-
vates  various  prescriptive  theories  of  legal interpretation  over  time
gaps.19  The category of a People exercising a will motivates Professsor
Ackerman's strivings to arrive at institutional paradigms of formal and
non-formal higher lawmaking  by the People. 0
If, then, those are the categories  of the concept of democratic con-
stitutional  fidelity for  which scholars  endeavor  to supply  substantive
clarification  and institutional form, what would be the corresponding
categories  of  the  concept  of  democratic  constitutional  agency  for
which we have comparable needs?  I suggest the following pair.  First,
there is the category of the contestable ideal  or standard, with revision-
ary reference  to which a  generation committed  to the end  of jointly
and severally free self-government can, with a view to that end, collec-
tively and critically reexamine the course of its public affairs.  How do
a generation's  worth  of people  determine  and  express a content  for
this necessarily public and shared critical standard, and what can the-
ory say  about this content?
Second, there is the category of the critical reexamination  as itself a
process of popular self rule.  What are the institutional forms and ar-
rangements  that  can constitute  a  normatively  self-governing  genera-
tion out  of  continuing,  critical  exchange  among  (1) the  claims  and
views of individuals,  (2)  an influential body of public opinion regard-
19.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity  and Constraint,  65 Fordham  L. Rev. 1365  (1997).
20.  See Ackerman, We  the People, supra note  11, passim.
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ing the rightness  of existing or proposed constitutional-legal  arrange-
ments,  and (3) the collective  (majoritarian or super-majoritarian)  acts
of legally authorized makers  and interpreters  of constitutional  law in-
cluding,  as  applicable,  electorates,  representative  legislative  assem-
blies, and constitutional courts?21
It seems  to me a whole lot easier to identify scholarly  workers  on
the  categories  of  democratic  constitutional  fidelity  than  scholarly
workers  on the categories  of democratic  constitutional  agency.  Our
pool of talents  and  energies  is not unlimited, and  I am  not sure why
we budget as we do.
21.  See Frank I. Michelman,  Book Review, 93 J. Phil  307, 312-14  (1996)  (review-
ing Jirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms  (1996)).
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